Can financial infrastructures foster economic development? by Chatelain, Jean-Bernard & Amable, Bruno
Can financial infrastructures foster economic
development?
Jean-Bernard Chatelain, Bruno Amable
To cite this version:
Jean-Bernard Chatelain, Bruno Amable. Can financial infrastructures foster economic
development?. Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, 2001, 64 (2), pp.481-498.
<10.1016/S0304-3878(00)00147-4>. <halshs-00112551>
HAL Id: halshs-00112551
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00112551
Submitted on 30 Nov 2006
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Can Financial Infrastructures Foster
Economic Development?∗
Bruno AMABLE†, Jean-Bernard CHATELAIN‡
Post-Print, Published in:
Journal of Development Economics (2001), vol. 64, pp.481-498.
Abstract
In this paper, financial infrastructures increase the eﬃciency of the banking
sector: they decrease the market power (due to horizontal diﬀerentiation) of the
financial intermediaries, lower the cost of capital, increase the number of deposi-
tors and the amount of intermediated savings, factors which in turn increase the
growth rate and may help countries to take oﬀ from a poverty trap. Taxation fi-
nances financial infrastructures and decreases the private productivity of capital.
Growth and welfare maximising levels of financial infrastructures are computed.
JEL classification: O16; E62; G21
Keywords: Endogenous growth; Imperfect competition; Financial infrastruc-
tures
Re´sume´
Dans cet article, les infrastructures financie`res accroissent l’eﬃcacite´ du
secteur bancaire: elles diminuent le pouvoir de marche´ des banques provenant
de la diﬀe´rentiation horizontale, elles font baisser le couˆt du capital, elles e´le`vent
la re´mune´ration de l’e´pargne, et, par conse´quent, le nombre des de´posants et
le montant de l’e´pargne interme´die´e. Ces facteurs sont a` l’origine d’une hausse
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du taux de croissance de l’e´conomie et permettent a` certains pays de sortir
d’un pie`ge a` pauvete´. Un financement par impoˆt des infrastructures financie`res
conduit en revanche a` une baisse du rendement net d’impoˆt du capital. On
de´termine la taille des infrastructures financie`res qui maximisent la croissance
ou le bien-eˆtre.
Classification JEL: O16; E62; G21
Mots-cle´s: Croissance endoge`ne; concurrence imparfaite; infrastructures fi-
nancie`res.
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1. Introduction
The need to build financial infrastructures is an important feature of Economies in
transition, where banking practice was lost after several decades of central planning,
and Less Developed Countries (LDC).1 It is often held as a precondition for economic
development, as financial intermediaries facilitate transactions, allocate capital and
collect savings.2 Financial infrastructures facilitate the collection of savings by banks,
and channel more resources towards the modern sectors of the economy. When the
financial system is rudimentary, some households may not have access to a bank or
other institutions in which they could deposit savings. Moreover, a lack of confidence
in the banking sector connected to failures to maintain property rights could make
people wary of depositing, so that some kind of government action can lower the costs
of intermediation and increase the collection of savings.3
Binswanger et al. [1993] show with the help of a panel data analysis for rural
India that public infrastructures and financial intermediaries exercised a joint positive
influence on agricultural investment and output and that ”bank expansion is greatly
facilitated by government investment in roads and regulated markets which enhance the
liquidity position of farmers and reduce transaction costs of both banks and farmers”4.
A distinction can be made between general purpose public infrastructures, such as
roads and telecommunications, used for many transactions other than financial ones,
and what can be called financial infrastructures. The role of these infrastructures
for economic development is emphasized in this paper. The services provided by
these financial infrastructures lower the costs of financial transactions. Many public
goods are specific to the financial sector. First of all, there is a specific knowledge
in both private and central banking practice (project appraisal, accounting, credit
scoring,...). It requires the education of banks employees as well as the education of
depositors5. Second, there exist a specific and common capital and technology shared
1See the special issue of the Journal of Banking and Finance [1993] ( September) on Banking in
transition economies and Fry [1995] for LDCs.
2On the role of financial intermediation in development, see the contributions in Hermes and
Lensink [1996].
3A typical case study where deﬃciencies in the collection of savings is one of the most important
factors limiting growth is Uganda in the recent years (Sharer et al. [1995]): few banks, including
two large state owned bank which have acquired the bulk of the branch network, the larger one
holding more than 40% of deposits, high intermediation margin, poor check clearing facilities and
strong reluctance of the public to use checks, an economy where the use of money is not developed
(a ratio of broad money to GDP of about 9 percent), with a large ratio of currency in circulation
to deposits (more than 30%), inadequate prudential regulation and supervision of the central bank,
lack of public confidence in the financial system, altogether with a short maturity and instability of
deposits leading to frequent financial distress of banks.
4Binswanger et al. [1993] p.363.
5Mulligan and Sala-I-Martin [1996] found that the cost of adopting financial technology in the US
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between banks for transactions purpose and the eﬃcient working of the payment
system6. Third, a specific authority must enforce banking laws and regulation in
order to preserve the stability of property rights of banks and depositors’ assets and
provide other services (supervision and coordination of the payment system...).7
This paper presents a model of endogenous growth with local banking monopolises
monopolies. Banks face spatial competition on the deposit market as in Salop’s [1979]
model, but depositors’ transaction costs and banks’ intermediation costs are endoge-
nous and depend on financial infrastructures. We characterize financial infrastructures
as a means to explicitly reduce transaction costs of depositors or fixed intermediation
costs of banks and thus to foster saving. An increase in the number of banks will
positively aﬀect the level of aggregate savings.8 Public intervention will determine the
amount of financial infrastructures in the economy and thus indirectly influence the
extent of imperfect competition in the banking sector, which will in turn aﬀect eco-
nomic growth and consumer welfare.9 An adequate amount of financial infrastructures
may also allow a country to take oﬀ from a poverty trap.
The paper follows the following progression. A second section describes the be-
haviour of firms, of households and of a banking oligopoly. A third section provides the
equilibrium growth rate for given financial infrastructures. A fourth section computes
the level of financial infrastructures that maximizes the growth rate or the aggregate
welfare. Conclusion and possible extensions of the model are dealt with in section five.
2. The model
2.1. Firms
We consider a constant returns to scale production function for the private sector
with capital K and labour N in a Cobb-Douglas specification.10 Capital is entirely
depreciated in one period.11 The final good Y is produced under perfect competition
(0 < α < 1).
is positively related to age and negatively related to the level of education of households.
6See Fry [1995], chapter 12.
7See Fry, Goodhart and Almeida [1996].
8The positive eﬀect of a high number of bank branches on the private savings rate has been found
to be significant in some applied studies for LDCs (Tun Wai [1972], Demetriade`s and Luintel [1994]).
Fry [1995] obtained that a ten per cent reduction in rural population per rural branch significantly
increased the national saving rate on average by 0.16 of a percentage point for six Asian countries
over the period 1961-1981.
9See Stiglitz [1995] and Levine [1996] for surveys on other types of public intervention in the
financial system.
10In what follows, the time index t may be suppressed when not necessary.
11This widely held assumption in overlapping generation models does not aﬀect the results of the
model. Non depreciating capital may be introduced by assuming that workers purchase used capital
from the elderly with their savings. Yt is then re-interpreted as gross output, i.e. including the capital
that is carried over between periods.
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Yt = At ·G1−α1,t ·Kαt ·N1−α (2.1)
Productivity incorporates a positive externality that is a function of “general purpose”
public infrastructures G1 as in Barro [1990]. Public capital, as well as private capital,
is fully depreciated in one period.
Companies are facing perfect competition and maximize profits. Output is taxed
at the rate τ . This rate is the sum of τGP which is needed to finance general purpose
public infrastructure, of the rate τ2 which finances financial infrastructures decreasing
transactions costs on the depositors side and of the rate τ3 which finances financial
infrastructures decreasing operating costs on the banking side. Firms have to borrow
the entire capital needed for production. The demand for credit is then derived from:
Kt ∈ ArgMax
n
(1− τ) ·At ·G1−α1,t ·Kαt ·N1−α − rc ·Kt − wt ·N
o
and rc is the interest factor on credit. One can then derive the following relationships
between factor prices and demands:
rc = (1− τ) · α ·At ·G1−α1,t ·Kα−1t ·N1−α (2.2)
wt = (1− τ) · (1− α) ·At ·G1−α1,t ·Kαt ·N−α (2.3)
In what follows, we normalise the population of each generation at N = 1.
2.2. Households behaviour and the deposit market
We consider a simple overlapping generations model. A fixed-size population of over-
lapping generations of agents live for two periods. There is a continuum of mass N = 1
of these agents. They are uniformly distributed on a circle of circumference equal to
unity. This formalizes horizontal diﬀerentiation and/or spatial heterogeneity. During
the first period, each agent inelastically supplies one unit of labour, saves a certain pro-
portion of her earnings, and does not provide bequests to their oﬀsprings. The agents
can invest their savings either in a storage technology12 or put them as deposits in
banks. This assumption of no financial markets is justified on the grounds that in most
LDCs it is statistically observed that direct financial claims, such as stocks and bonds,
are unimportant compared with intermediated claims (such as deposits in banks and
nonbank depository institutions included).
We assume that the utility function of an agent living in t and t + 1 is log-linear
and depends on the levels of consumption at the end of each of the two periods:
12For simplication purposes, we assume that investment in the storage technology does not con-
tribute to national income. This is not strictly necessary, what matters is that non intermediated
savings should not be as eﬃcient as intermediated savings. We thus assume that only banks can
channel saving resources to the ’modern’ sector of the economy.
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U = log [Ct] +
1
1 + ρ
· log [Ct+1] (2.4)
ρ is the rate of time preference. First period’s consumption is equal to the diﬀerence
between wage income and savings, while second period’s consumption is equal to the
revenues derived from savings, thus:
U = log [wt − St] +
1
1 + ρ
· log [zt+1 · St] (2.5)
where w is the real wage, S is the individual amount of savings and z the real return
on savings on any assets (deposits or storage technology). From this specification
follows an individual saving function inelastic to the real return:13
St =
wt
2 + ρ
(2.6)
The assumption of savings function inelastic with respect to the interest rate is
not that odd: Tun Wai [1972] noted that surveys in LDCs confirmed that the saving
propensity does not seem to depend on the interest rate, but that rural households
take into account the opportunity cost of deposits, the interest rate or the return on
storable goods, in the decision on how to use savings (crops or money).
There is imperfect competition in the banking sector because of horizontal (spatial)
diﬀerentiation as in Salop’s [1979] model. We consider the existence of n banks indexed
by i. Spatial competition takes place on a circle whose circumference is normalised to
unity, over which banks are equidistributed. The lender deposits her money to bank i
if it receives a return net of the transaction cost of the ”trip to the bank” higher than
the return from a storage technology µ, which can be negative.
rdi,t − d · l ≥ µ (2.7)
rdi,t is the deposit rate of bank i at date t, l is the distance between a consumer’s
location and bank i’s location, and d · l is the lender transportation cost per unit of
saving. We adopt here a simple linear specification for this eﬀect as is done in most
of the literature on this topic.
d · l · St the transportation cost factor, is assumed to be a decreasing function
of the services provided by financial infrastructures G2. There is a standard ”free
rider” coordination problem between financial intermediaries to pay for financial in-
frastructures, so that the government has to finance these public goods. It finances
these infrastructures with an income tax on private firms. The budget constraint is
G2 = τ2 · Y .
It is surely the case the transportation costs for trips to the banks aﬀect much less
savings in industrialised countries than in LDCs due to the existence of fully developed
road infrastructures and networks of bank branches, as well as recent innovations such
13A linear utility function provides also a saving function inelastic to the real return.
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as automated teller machines (ATM) networks and phone banking. But, if we do not
stick to the literal explanation of transportation costs, we can relate this cost to a lack
of confidence in financial intermediaries connected to deﬃciencies in the preservation
of property rights of depositors.14 Then one can assume that the cost is proportional
to the amount left in the bank: this amount can be lost in a bankruptcy of the bank.
The transaction cost (or distance) factor per unit of savings, d, is assumed to be
a decreasing function of the services provided by financial infrastructures G2, which
fully depreciate after one period, as assumed for private capital. For homogeneity and
simplicity, G2 is divided by Y in the specification of d, so that the distance factor
is d
³
G
Y
´
15. This way, the endogenous marginal transportation cost d
h
G2
Y
i
can be
expressed as d (τ2).
The farther the consumer is from the bank located at l = 0, the more costly it
is for her to deposit her assets in that bank. A consumer keeps her assets with the
storage technology when the return on deposits, net of transportation costs, available
from the banks located on either side is lower than the return on the storable good.
The marginal lender who is indiﬀerent between depositing her money at bank i and
holding it in the storage technology, is located at a distance lm from the bank, defined
by the following equation :
lm =
rdi − µ
d
(2.8)
We will mainly assume that the number of banks (n) is always such that the
distance between two banks is larger than 2 · lm so that the deposit markets of each
bank do not overlap, which is a reasonable assumption for LDCs (the number of banks
will be endogenously determined through a free entry condition, the growth rate in
the case of “touching” markets will also be considered).
1
n
≥ 2 · lm (2.9)
The market area served by the bank i, located at l = 0, is therefore 2 · lm. Given the
density of depositors per unit of distance N = 1 and their unit supply of savings, the
supply of deposit in bank i, Di is equal to
Di,t = 2 · r
d
i − µ
d
· wt
2 + ρ
(2.10)
This equation shows that depositors reduce their deposits if the transportation
rate of the trip to the bank d or the rate of return on the storable good µ increases
14See Barro and Sala-I-Martin ([1995] p. 159-160 for an identical interpretation of public infras-
tructures or public services as a mean to preserve property rights.
15See Barro and Sala-i-Martin [1995] for an exposition of the congestion eﬀect incorporated as a
negative eﬀect of total infrastructure usage (taken to be represented by Y ). They propose the typical
example of public services as an influence on the preservation of property rights (p.159-160) and the
theft probability. This is particularly relevant for the Russian banking sector in the 90’s.
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and if the deposit rate rd decreases.
2.3. Banks behaviour
There is imperfect competition on both credit and deposit markets. Imperfect com-
petition on the deposit market is the consequence of the spatial dimension, and banks
behave a` la Nash. We assume that banks compete on the credit market following a
Cournotian imperfect competition.16 Each bank incurs a fixed cost F at the end of
each period. The bank chooses the amount of credit oﬀered to firms and the amount
of deposits taken from households. The index i is for a given bank. In the symmetric
equilibria we consider, the credit market share of bank i is denoted ki = K/n, and:
(Di,t, ki,t+1) ∈ ArgMax Πi = rc · ki,t+1 − rdi ·Di,t − F (2.11)
subject to the balance sheet constraint of the bank, to the aggregate demand for credit
and to the local monopoly demand for deposits:
ki,t+1 = Di,t
Di,t =
2wt
2 + ρ
· r
d
i − µ
d
rc = (1− τ) · α ·At ·G1−α1,t ·Kα−1t ·N1−α
The equilibrium of imperfect competition is defined by the Cournot-Nash equilib-
rium of a game with n players (banks) where the strategies are the choice of deposit
rates. The best response functions of banks are the first order conditions of the above
program. The symmetric equilibrium of imperfect competition is characterised by
deposit rates being identical for all banks, one obtains:
rd =
1
2
·
µ+
µ
1 +
α− 1
n
¶
rc
¸
(2.12)
The equilibrium deposit rate increases with the credit rate and the rate of return
on the storable good. It lies between the credit rate and the rate of return on the
storable good, as a weighted average of the two (α−1
n
is related to the Cournotian
mark-up on credit, which depend on the elasticity of demand and on the number of
competitors). The spread between the credit rate and the deposit rate measures the
extent of imperfect competition.
A higher level of financial infrastructure can lower the fixed operating costs in the
intermediation activity. In so doing, it relaxes entry barriers and increases competition
and eﬃciency in the banking sector. This is particularly relevant for the infrastructures
specific to the payment system shared by banks. As observed recently in economies in
16See Bensa¨ıd and De Palma [1995] for the general case of Cournotian competition mixed with
horizontal diﬀerentiation.
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transition (as well as OECD countries), the building of a good computerized telecom-
munication network between banks can help to develop the payment system such as
check-clearing facilities, automated teller machines (ATM) networks, phone banking,
and other tools reducing clearing time. Investment in these network infrastructures is
generally financed both by the public and the private sector. The public sector finance
G3 which decreases the operating costs of banking. Banks pays the remaining fixed
intermediation costs related to the network F (G3), with F
0 (G3) < 0. The publicly
provided part is financed by taxation, so that G3 = τ3Y .
We assume that the fixed investment in banking in the whole economy, nt · Ft,
is a given share of the overall existing capital, i.e. nt · Ft (G3) = f (G3/Kt) · Kt,
with f 0 < 0 and f 00 > 0. We define the ratio of fixed public investment in banking
infrastructure with respect to overall investment by θ3 = G3/Kt. This assumption is
very widely held in endogenous growth models incorporating fixed costs so that they
do not become negligible with respect to output in a growing economy. But it is much
more than a technical assumption. It is empirically sound for numerous reasons. New
technology in banking requires an increased amount of capital related to information
technology.17 For the particular case of the infrastructures pertaining to the payment
system, the number of transactions grows faster than GNP, which increases the capital
invested and the costs of the system. Fry ([1995] p. 322-327) surveyed that in some
LDCs, bank operating costs do tend to rise at least as fast as GNP due to non price
competition. Real wages of bank employees increase over time18.
There is free entry in the banking activity, so that the long run equilibrium number
of banks in the economy, n, is determined by the dissipation of profits. Ignoring the
integer constraint, the equilibrium number of banks is then:
n∗ =
(1− α) · rc
2 · f(θ3) + µ− rc (2.13)
It is straightforward to check that an increase in the tax rate (or the marginal
productivity of firms) reduces the number of banks and thus aggravates the imper-
fection in competition in the banking activity. An increase in the level of fixed cost
in intermediation reduces the number of banks at the equilibrium, as can be seen
immediately from the expression for n∗ above. Likewise, an increase in the return of
the alternative assets (µ) modifies the decision to go to the bank and lowers financial
intermediaries’ profits. This eﬀect decreases the number of banks at the equilibrium.
17See the Economist [1996]: “A Survey of Technology in Finance: Turning Digits into Dollars”.
18We investigated an alternative assumption regarding these operating costs. The operating costs
are wt · f(G3), with f 0(G3) < 0 where f is a fixed proportion of labour employed in each banks.
Financial infrastructures decrease the number of workers necessary to run a bank. These workers are
located at the same spot as the bank. Their savings are collected with no transaction costs and add
to savings collected from the remaining part of the population, located uniformly on a circle. This
assumption changes the expressions of the real wage, the return to capital and the number of banks.
It complicates quite sensibly the mathematics of the model but does not alter the main arguments
of the paper.
9
In what follows, we assume that some households do not deposit in banks, i.e.
0 < l∗ < 1/2n∗, and banks do operate (n∗ > 0). Then, the return on capital rc is
bounded according to this condition: f(θ3) + µ < r
c < 2 · f(θ3) + µ. Banks do exist,
i.e. the economy is not stuck in a poverty trap due to too high banking operating
costs. Substituting the equilibrium number of banks after free entry and the value of
the marginal product of capital in the equilibrium deposit rate and collected savings
by bank i, one has:
rd = rc − f(θ3) (2.14)
l∗ =
rd − µ
d(τ2)
=
rc − [f(θ3) + µ]
d(τ2)
(2.15)
3. Financing “General Purpose” Infrastructures
3.1. Growth
As Barro [1990], we assumed that the government runs a balanced budget financed
by a proportional tax at rate τ on the aggregate of gross output.
G1 = τGP · Y (3.1)
From this equation and the production function, we get an expression for G1:
G1 = (τGPA)
1/α ·K (3.2)
Therefore, the production function can be written as:
Y = (τGP )
(1−α)/α ·A1/α ·K (3.3)
It follows that the share of financial infrastructure devoted to fixed investment in
banking with respect to capital is a linear function of the tax rate τ3. θ3 = G3/Kt =
(τGP )
(1−α)/α ·A1/α · τ3. From now on, we use the simplified notation f (τ3) for f (θ3) =
f
³
(τGP )
(1−α)/αA1/ατ3
´
.
We can substitute this expression of general purpose public infrastructures into the
marginal conditions, in order to determine the macro-economic level of the interest
rate and of the real wage:
rc = α ·A1/α · τ (1−α)/αGP · (1− τGP − τ2 − τ3) (3.4)
wt = (1− α) ·A1/α · τ (1−α)/αGP · (1− τGP −−τ2 − τ3) ·Kt (3.5)
=
1− α
α
· rc ·Kt (3.6)
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We recall that we assumed that borrowers (firms) can receive funds from financial
intermediaries only. Aggregate capital investment, which is equal to the aggregate
capital stock since capital entirely depreciates at each period, is equal to aggregate
savings of the young generation collected by the banks.
We define “local monopolies” on the deposit market as the case where there remains
a fringe of households who never deposit in a bank, and ”touching markets” as the case
where all households deposit in a bank, although, strictly speaking, both cases deals
with “local monopolies”. An intermediation fixed costs and imperfect competition on
the credit side are necessary assumptions for the existence of “local monopolies” on
the deposit side. Perfect competition on the credit market would imply that “touching
markets” on the deposit market are the optimal long run behaviour of banks. Free
entry would lead new banks to fill the gaps in the areas where households do not
deposit.
In the case of “local monopolies” on the deposit market (f (τ3) + µ < r
c < 2 ·
f (τ3) + µ), the growth rate is equal to:
gt =
Kt+1
Kt
= n∗ · (2 · l∗) · wt
(2 + ρ) ·Kt (3.7)
=
2 · (1− α)2
α · (2 + ρ) ·
(rc)2
2 · f (τ3) + µ− rc ·
rc − [f (τ3) + µ]
d (τ2)
= g
Ã
rc
+
, ρ
−
, d
−
, f
−
, µ
−
!
One can see the influence of the financial intermediation sector on growth through
the number of banks n∗ and the market share of a bank measured by the distance
2 · l∗ which increases collected savings. The growth rate is constant over time, as
is customary in A.K-type endogenous growth models, and depends positively on the
saving rate (through the rate of time preference ρ) and on the productivity of capital,
diminished by the marginal rate of unproductive taxation. Imperfect competition in
the banking sector adds the two negative eﬀects on growth of operating costs of banks
f (τ3) and of the return of the alternative assets for depositors µ. The positive eﬀect
of infrastructures on growth can appear clearly through the eﬀect on d, as a decrease
in the transaction cost incurred by the depositor d is beneficial to growth. Likewise, if
infrastructures increase the level of private productivity A or decrease operating costs
of banks f (τ3), it is also beneficial to growth.
The growth rate in case of “touching” deposit markets (for rc > 2 ·f (τ3)+µ, where
the fixed operating cost in banking is low enough so that local monopolies disappear)
is such that all savings are collected by banks. It is simply given by:
gt =
wt
(2 + ρ) ·Kt =
(1− α)
(2 + ρ) · α · r
c (3.8)
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It can be computed without knowing the interest rate resulting from the banks’ optimal
program in the case of ”touching markets”. As the amount of individual savings does
not depend on the interest rate, the growth rate is not aﬀected by the price eﬀect
(mark-down on deposit) due to imperfect competition among intermediaries. In the
case of touching markets, all savings are collected and horizontal diﬀerentiation does
not aﬀect the number of depositors.
In the case of touching markets, if the individual amount of savings is elastic to
the interest rate, imperfect competition (with or without horizontal diﬀerentiation19)
aﬀect growth through a markup on price, which then decreases savings in the case
of touching markets. This standard cournotian competition eﬀect has already been
modelled in endogenous growth.20
In the case of local monopolies that we emphasize in this paper, imperfect compe-
tition with horizontal diﬀerentiation decreases directly the number of depositors, and
hence the amount of collected savings. An increase in the number of local branches
(which is itself related to the markup), as well as a higher markup determines this
quantity. Indeed a utility function which implies a dependance of the propension to
save to the interest rate would mix the two eﬀects in our model.
If the productivity level is so low that it is under the sum of the fixed cost per
unit of deposit and the return of the non-productive asset (rc < f (τ3) + µ), then no
savings are collected to finance the productive sector, intermediaries do not operate,
and the economy remains stuck in a poverty trap, indeed connected to the fixed costs
of intermediation. If no banks operate (n∗ = 0, so that rc < f (τ3) + µ) due to high
intermediation costs, high transaction costs for depositors and a high return on the
storage technology, the economy is also stuck in a poverty trap with no growth. No
savings are collected by banks and, therefore, the productive sector has no means of
finance.
3.2. Optimal Level of “General Purpose” Infrastructures
We consider now welfare implications of our analysis. There are four sources of inef-
ficiency in the model. First, there is the usual missing market for intergenerational
trade that arises in overlapping generations models without bequests. Second, we
have the Barro-style positive externality from capital formation. Third, there is the
Hotelling distortion on the collection of savings due to horizontal diﬀerentiation with
local monopolies. Fourth, we have the congestion externality that arises from financial
infrastructures, because banks and firms ignore the impact of their decisions on the
use of infrastructures on transaction costs.
19Horizontal diﬀerentiation of agents with an elasticity of demand diﬀerent from zero leads to a
mark-up which depends simultaneously on the elasticity of demand (as in the Lerner index) and on
a parameter of horizontal diﬀerentiation (Bensa¨ıd and De Palma [1995])
20The number of intermediaries aﬀect growth with cournotian monopolistic competition between
intermediaries but without horizontal diﬀerentiation in Berthe´le´my and Varoudakis [1996].
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As a welfare measure for this population of heterogeneous agents, we consider the
sum of utilities across agents in a representative generation.21 Defining s = 1/ (2 + ρ)
the propensity to save out of wage income (which is constant with respect to the tax
rate), and letting UA denote this sum of utilities, we obtain:
UA = log [(1− s) · wt] + log [s · wt]
1 + ρ
(3.9)
+
2 · n∗
1 + ρ
·
(Z l∗
0
log
h
rd − d · i
i
di+
Z 1/(2·n∗)
l∗
log [µ] di
)
Households face heterogeneity of the return net of transportation cost on their savings.
Maximising UA with respect to the tax rate amounts to maximising:
1
s
· log [wt] (3.10)
+2 · n
∗
d
·
n
rd · log
h
rd
i
− d · l∗ −
³
rd − d · l∗
´
· log
h
rd − d · l∗
i
− d · l∗ · log [µ]
o
Dividing the real wage by the capital of the preceding period in order to exhibit
the steady state growth rate, substituting d · l∗ = rd − µ, rd = rc − f and wt =
1−α
α · rc · Kt , and eliminating “constants” with respect to the tax rates leads the
”average” household to maximise:
UB =
1
s
· log [g · rc] + 2 · n
∗ (rc)
d
·
(
(rc − f) ·
"
log
"
rc − f
µ
#
− 1
#
− µ
)
The average utility is proportional to UB, a strictly increasing function of the
growth rate g and of the net of taxation productivity rc. The growth rate g is itself a
strictly increasing function of rc. Therefore, one has:
∂UA
∂τGP
=
∂UB (g, r
c)
∂τGP
=
"
∂UB
∂g
∂g
∂rc
+
∂UB
∂rc
#
∂rc
∂τGP
= 0⇔ ∂r
c
∂τGP
= 0
⇔ ∂g
∂τGP
=
∂g
∂rc
· ∂r
c
∂τGP
= 0
As a consequence, the growth maximising tax rate is equal to the (average) utility
maximising tax rate as in Barro [1990]. The optimal tax rate is given by:
∂rc
∂τGP
= 0⇒ (1− α) · (1− τ2 − τ3) = τ ∗GP . (3.11)
21A social planner can also consider a discounted aggregate of the welfare of all generations, in
order to tackle the intergenerational optimality condition, which is a general source of ineﬃciency
for the overlapping generation model without bequests.
13
For the remaining part of the paper, we consider that this tax policy is implemented
so that the net of tax rate of return is equal to:
rc = α2 ·A1/α · (1− α)(1−α)/α · (1− τ2 − τ3)1/α (3.12)
The change with respect to Barro’s [1990] result is only due to the financing of
specific financial infrastructures (τ2 + τ3 > 0). Indeed, an increase in the tax rate for
financial infrastructures lower the net of tax aggregate return on capital rc. But they
are able to increase the growth rate and welfare through the fixed intermediation cost
parameter ( f) and the depositors transactions costs (d).
4. Financial Infrastructures and Growth
4.1. Financial Infrastructures and Banks Fixed Intermediation Costs
The welfare maximising tax rate is given by:
∂UA
∂τ3
= 0⇔ 0 = d
2 · s ·
"
gτ3
g
− r
c
τ3
rc
#
+ (4.1)
+n∗τ3 ·
(
(rc − f) ·
"
log
"
rc − f
µ
#
− 1
#
− µ
)
+n∗ ·
"
rcτ3 · log
"
rc − f
µ
##
with gτ3 = ∂g/∂τ3 and r
c
τ3 = ∂r
c/∂τ3. It is therefore necessary to compute gτ3 .
From (3.7), one obtains:
gτ3
g
=
2 · rcτ3
rc
+
rcτ3 − 2 · fτ3(τ3)
2 · f (τ3) + µ− rc +
rcτ3 − fτ3(τ3)
rc − f (τ3) + µ
(4.2)
A decrease in fixed intermediation costs due to financial infrastructures increases
growth through an increase in the amount of savings due to a rise in the number of
depositors for each bank and an increase in the number of banks. On the other hand,
a rise in the tax rate τ3 decreases the net of tax aggregate productivity r
c so that the
wage income is reduced, as well as the number of banks and the market share for each
bank. This trade-oﬀ leads to an interior solution if the marginal productivity of new
investment in this kind of financial infrastructure is suﬃciently high.
The first term on the right hand side is negative and represents the negative eﬀect
of taxation on wages through a decrease in the aggregate private productivity. The
second term is the eﬀect of financial infrastructures on the number of banks. When
τ3 is small, the marginal productivity of new investment in this kind of financial
infrastructure |f 0(τ3)| is large so that the eﬀect of an increased τ3 is to augment the
equilibrium number of banks. f 0(τ3) goes to zero as τ3 increases, so that the positive
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eﬀect is reversed, and the equilibrium number of banks eventually decreases when τ3
is large. The third term represents the change in the market share of one bank l∗ and
thus a change in the number of depositors. For a small τ3, |f 0(τ3)| is larger than rcτ3 ,
and becomes smaller as τ3 rises.
From equation (4.1), it is obvious to remark that the growth maximising tax rate,
for which gτ3 = 0, is not in general equal to the utility maximising tax rate. A
counter-example is provided with A = 5.7, α = 0.45, d = 1.75, µ = 1.02, s = 0.5 and
f [τ3] = 0.2 [τ3]
−0.8, one obtains a growth maximising tax rate of approximately 2.46%,
and an average utility maximising tax rate of approximately 2.36%.
The benefits of financial infrastructures as decreasing the fixed costs of interme-
diation are not equally shared by households. Only the agents going to the bank
obtain a higher return (on their savings) due to a rise in the deposit rate. A few
“marginal” households benefit from infrastructures and shift their savings from the
storage technology to deposits (the eﬀect on the number of banks and on l∗ in the
welfare function). But a range of households do not benefit from intermediation, and
therefore from financial infrastructures. The average household put less weight on
financial infrastructure than a growth maximising government so that welfare max-
imising tax rate is lower than the growth maximising one.
4.2. Foreign aid and poverty trap
The existence of this growth maximising level of financial infrastructures allows to
consider the case of countries stuck in a poverty trap, if they invested a suboptimal
level of financial infrastructures τ3 < τ
∗
3 such that r
c (τ3) < f(τ3) + µ. The optimal
level of financial infrastructures may verify the condition rc (τ ∗3 ) > f(τ
∗
3 )+µ. In these
cases, a shift to the optimal level of financial infrastructures allows the country to
take oﬀ from the poverty trap. Economies in transition are an example for such a
shift from sup-optimal financial infrastructures to a higher level, as a precondition for
economic growth.
In this model, we consider a closed economy, where government cannot rely on
foreign capital. An extension can deal with foreign aid directed to financial infrastruc-
tures. If funds and transfers of banking technology are specifically directed, during a
long enough period, to countries where the financial sector is rudimentary, this may
increase internal savings and help to take oﬀ from a poverty trap. To rationalise a
temporary foreign aid, one could assume for example that financial infrastructures are
not fully depreciated at each period.
4.3. Financial Infrastructures and Depositors Transaction Costs
From now on, we consider that the optimal policy for the previous kind of financial
infrastructure is implemented, so that τ3 = τ
∗
3 . We study the eﬀect of financial
infrastructures through a decrease of depositors transaction costs on economic growth.
The positive eﬀect of infrastructures on growth comes through the eﬀect of financial
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infrastructures on the distance l∗ =
rc(τ2)−(f+µ)
d(τ2) . The transaction cost d does not aﬀect
the number of banks or the real wage. l∗ represents the number of people who will
bring their savings to a bank. More precisely,
l∗τ2
l∗
=
rcτ2 (τ2)
rc (τ2)− (f + µ)
− dτ2
d
(4.3)
Collected savings increase with an increase of market share for banks l∗ which increases
with τ2 as long as the marginal gain of transportation cost reduction −dτ2/d is greater
than the marginal cost of the reduction of productivity of firms due to taxation (the
first term of the right hand side expresssion). On the other hand, an increase of the tax
rate τ2 imply a decrease of the number of banks and a decrease of individual savings
due to the decrease of net of tax productivity. The growth rate is balanced according
to the same trade-oﬀ:
∂g
∂τ2
= 0⇔ l
∗
τ2
l∗
+
2rcτ2
rc
+
rcτ2
2 · f + µ− rc = 0 (4.4)
The first expression between square brackets above is decreasing with τ2 whereas
the second expression increases with τ . Under suitable conditions on the parameters
such that the economy remains in the “local monopoly” regime on the deposit market
(f+µ < rc (τ2) < 2·f+µ)22 and such that the marginal productivity of new investment
in this financial infrastructure is suﬃciently high, dτ2
d
, there exists an interior solution
τ ∗2 such that the diﬀerence between the two expression vanishes and the growth rate
is maximised.
We now consider welfare implications of our analysis. The ”average” household
maximises:
log [rcg] +
2 · s · n∗
d
·
(
rd ·
"
log
"
rd
µ
#
− 1
#
− µ
)
Deriving the expression with respect to τ2 gives the following expression:
∂UA
∂τ2
= 0⇔ 1
2 · s
"
gτ2
g
− r
c
τ2
rc
#
+
n∗τ2 · d− n∗ · dτ2
d2
·
(
rc − f ·
"
log
"
rc − f
µ
#
− 1
#
− µ
)
+
n∗
d
·
"
rcτ2 · log
"
rc − f
µ
##
= 0 (4.5)
From this equation, it is obvious to remark that the growth maximising tax rate, for
which gτ2 = 0, is not in general equal to the utility maximising tax rate. Taking a
22The regime with full collection of deposits over the circle implies the same welfare trade-oﬀ than
the regime with local monopolies. The trade-oﬀ disappears for the growth rate.
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numerical example with A = 5.7, α = 0.45, f = 1, µ = 1.02, s = 0.5 and d [τ2] =
0.2 · [τ2]−0.8, one obtains a growth maximising tax rate of approximately 6, 2%, and
a utility maximising tax rate of approximately 5, 8%. This counter example shows
that the welfare maximising tax rate can be lower than the growth maximising. The
growth rate is given through the savings of households who provide deposit, as we
assumed that only deposits are invested in accumulable and productive assets. The
remaining part of savings are stored in non productive assets by the households for
whom the “trip to the bank” remains too costly and who do not benefit from the
financial infrastructures. Hence, the average household put less weight on public
infrastructure than a growth maximising government.
5. Conclusion
This paper deals with the eﬀect of financial infrastructures on economic growth, with
financial intermediaries as local monopolies due to horizontal diﬀerentiation. Finan-
cial infrastructures decrease depositors transaction costs or fixed intermediation costs.
They change consumer welfare through an increase of the proximity of financial ser-
vices, which in turn increases savings and endogenous growth. Endogenous growth
models have mostly stressed the eﬀect of public capital directly inside the aggregate
production function. To some extent, they neglected a simultaneous eﬀect on the
welfare of households caused by the use of public capital, which may be of the same
order as the eﬀect of infrastructure on the productive sector.
Assuming an elastic demand for deposit with respect to the interest rate is possible,
albeit a complicated expression of aggregate deposit. First, the eﬀect will be similar
to standard cournotian imperfect competition models of intermediaries which have
already been dealt with previous endogenous growth articles. Second, this assumption
will not change the two basic points we wanted to stress: (i) local monopolies limit
savings through the number of depositors, (ii) financial infrastructures help to relieve
the transaction costs, and, as a consequence, the extent of imperfect competition.
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